Daniel Agness, UMD Economics

Presentation Title: Don’t Know, Don’t Care? Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Responsive Public Services in Ethiopia

About the Presentation

Using rich survey data spanning citizens, firms and local government officials working in Ethiopia’s decentralized bureaucracy, we document low knowledge of public priorities among local bureaucrats, and substantial mismatch between priorities of bureaucrats and those of the public. We rule out information frictions as the primary cause, by experimentally showing that (a) bureaucrats fail to update beliefs or adapt policy when provided with feedback on citizens’ and firms’ priorities, even in sectors over which they have high autonomy; (b) bureaucrats’ demand for such information is very low. We also show that bureaucrats do not react when they know feedback from citizens and firms is being elicited, suggesting low accountability. These results highlight the limitations of decentralized bureaucracies in providing locally tailored public services without incentives or intrinsic motivation to meet public demand.

About the Speaker

Daniel is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, College Park. He completed his PhD in Agricultural and Resource Economics at UC Berkeley in 2024. His research focuses on urbanization, agricultural transformation, and social networks in East Africa.

Seminar Format:

Location IN PERSON: 2208 LeFrak Hall. We are requesting advanced registration so that we can track capacity.  Please use this link to RSVP for in-person attendance.

Location ONLINE VIA ZOOM: Zoom registration link.  Upon registration, you will receive an automatically generated email with the direct link for the seminar

If accommodations are needed, please send a request to the meeting organizer (mprc-support@umd.edu) at least 72 hours prior to the event, if possible, to allow time to discuss and implement alternatives.